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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Randall Porath contends the district court erred in each of the two cases on 
appeal by not ruling on his motions for appointment of counsel before denying his 
motions for credit for time served.  For example, he asserts one of those motions, in 
which he claimed credit for ninety days he was in custody during his period of probation, 
had colorable merit under the 2015 amendments to Idaho’s credit statutes and/or 
because there was no term or condition in the Judgment of Conviction or attached 
terms of probation which authorized incarceration during his period of probation.  
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the orders denying Mr. Porath’s motions for credit 
for time served and remand these cases for further proceedings upon appointment of 
counsel to represent Mr. Porath. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Porath initially pled guilty in a 2013 case to possession of methamphetamine, 
and, pursuant to a binding plea agreement, was sentenced to “credit for time served, 
with no additional actual jail or prison sentence, . . . and unsupervised probation for a 
period of 2 1/2 years.  The underlying sentence to be 4 years with 2 years fixed.”  
(R., p.81 (the binding plea agreement); R., p.83 (the district court agreeing to be bound 
by that plea agreement).)  In the Judgment of Conviction, the district court noted 
Mr. Porath was entitled to credit for fifty-seven days of incarceration.  (R., p.87.)  The 
Judgment of Conviction also incorporated terms and conditions of probation, none of 
which addressed discretionary jail time or any other incarceration as a term of 
probation.  (See R., pp.87-90.)  
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Thereafter, Mr. Porath was alleged to have violated the terms of that probation by 
possessing methamphetamine, and that also resulted in a new charge of possession of 
a controlled substance (the 2014 case).  (R., pp.94-95, 221-22; see also R., pp.107-08, 
224-25 (summons for Mr. Porath’s appearance in both cases).)  Pursuant to a global 
plea agreement, Mr. Porath agreed to plead guilty to the new possession charge and 
admit the corresponding allegation of probation violation.  (R., pp.124, 272.)  There was 
no discussion of credit for time served in the global plea agreement.  (See generally 
R., pp.124, 272.)  The parties also did not discuss credit for time served at the 
disposition/sentencing hearing.  (See generally Tr.)  The district court ultimately revoked 
Mr. Porath’s probation and executed his sentence in the 2013 case, and it imposed and 
executed a concurrent unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, in the 2014 
case.  (Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, L.7.)  The district court also explained:   
THE COURT:  In the 2013 case, you do have 57 days for credit for time 
served.   And that’s the Court’s judgment.   
 
[THE PROSECUTOR]:  What was the credit again in ’13? 
 
THE COURT:  He had 57 days on the 2013 case and I don’t believe he 
served anymore time since then.   
 
(Tr., p.14, Ls.18-24.)  Nevertheless, in the respective judgments, the district court 
referred to a “stipulation” by the parties as to the amount of credit due on each case 
(fifty-seven days and zero days respectively).  (R., pp.130, 291.)  Mr. Porath’s attorney 
subsequently filed notices of withdrawal in both cases.  (R., pp.145, 308.) 
 Approximately one year later, Mr. Porath filed a motion pursuant to I.C.R. 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) bearing both case numbers.  (R., pp.153-55, 316-18.)  He 
asserted, in accordance with the 2015 amendments to Idaho’s credit statutes 
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(I.C. §§ 18-301, 19-2603, and 20-209A), he was entitled to credit for the time he “was 
not at large and should be fully eligible to receive his street time on probation as well as 
the 90 days confinement during his probationary period.”  (R., pp.154, 317.)  He also 
filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel bearing both case 
numbers.  (R., pp.158-60, 321-23.) 
The district court did not address Mr. Porath’s motions for appointment of 
counsel.  (See generally R.)  However, it did address the merits of his motions.  For 
example, it determined he was not entitled to credit for the “street time” on probation 
under the plain language of the statute.  (R., pp.169-70, 332-33.)  It denied the 
remainder of his motions based on its conclusion that the parties had stipulated to the 
appropriate credit awards in the two cases.  (R., pp.170, 333.)   
Mr. Porath filed pro se notices of appeal in both cases timely from the orders 
denying his motions for credit for time served.  (R., pp.173, 336.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred in the 2013 case by not ruling on Mr. Porath’s 
motion for appointment of counsel before denying his motion for credit for time 
served. 
 
2. Whether the district court erred in the 2014 case by not ruling on Mr. Porath’s 
motion for appointment of counsel before denying his motion for credit for time 
served. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred In The 2013 Case By Not Ruling On Mr. Porath’s Motion For 
Appointment Of Counsel Before Denying His Motion For Credit For Time Served 
 
 
A. Standard Of Review 
 
“A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at all critical stages in the criminal 
process, including in pursuit of a Rule 35 motion.”  State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 902 
(Ct. App. 2014) (citing, inter alia, I.C. §§ 19-851, 19-852).  However, counsel may be 
denied in the Rule 35 context if the Rule 35 motion itself is frivolous.  Id.  Whether a 
Rule 35 motion is frivolous, and thus, whether counsel should have been appointed, is a 
matter the appellate courts will freely review.  See id. 
 
B. Mr. Porath Should Have Been Appointed Counsel Because His Motion For Credit 
For Time Served In The 2013 Case Was Not Frivolous 
 
When a pro se defendant moves for appointment of counsel at the same time he 
files a motion for relief under Rule 35, the district court errs if it does not address the 
motion for appointment of counsel before addressing the merits of the motion itself.  
State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 525 (Ct. App. 1994).  Since the district court addressed 
the merits of Mr. Porath’s Rule 35 motion for credit for time served without addressing 
his motion for appointment of counsel, the district court erred in this case. 
However, such an error will be deemed harmless if there is no colorable merit to 
the underlying claim for relief.  Id.  The district court’s error in this case is not harmless 
because Mr. Porath’s motion for credit for time served in the 2013 case has colorable 
merit, particularly in regard to his claim for credit for “the 90 days confinement during his 
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probationary period.”  (R., pp.154, 317.)  That claim is meritorious because there was 
no condition of Mr. Porath’s probation agreement authorizing incarceration during the 
term of probation.  Compare State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381, 386 (2016).  All the 
Judgment of Conviction says is “you are placed on unsupervised probation for a period 
of 2 1/2 years upon the terms and conditions set forth below and upon the attached 
‘Probation Terms and Conditions.’”  (R., p.87.)  There are no further terms of probation 
articulated in the judgment itself.  (See generally R., pp.86-88.)  The attached Probation 
Terms and Conditions identify nine terms of probation, none of which require serving 
discretionary jail or any other form of incarceration during the period of probation.  (See 
R., pp.89-90.)  
As the Idaho Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed:  “whether discretionary jail 
time is a condition of probation depends on what is set out by the district court and 
agreed to by [the defendant] in the probation order.”  Taylor, 160 Idaho at 386.  Thus, 
“[w]hen the court suspends the judgment and places the defendant on probation, the 
conditions of probation must be included in the written document suspending probation.”  
Id.1  The reason for this rule is that when the defendant has not agreed to serve 
incarceration as a term of his probation, he is entitled to credit for time served during a 
                                            
1 While Taylor had not yet been issued at the time the district court ruled on Mr. Porath’s 
motions for credit for time served, the Taylor Court explained the rule requiring that the 
written Judgment of Conviction contain the terms of probation was derived from 
decisions dating back to 1924 and 1911.  Taylor, 160 Idaho at 386 n.2.  It also 
explained the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122 (Ct. App. 
1996), had properly explained how the pre-2015-amendment credit statues operated in 
a case where there was no term of probation authorizing a period of incarceration.  
Taylor, 160 Idaho at 385.  Since the rule Taylor was applying and the analysis it was 
using both existed in precedents which were controlling on the district court at the time 
the district court ruled on Mr. Porath’s motion, Taylor is still useful in understanding how 
that rule and analysis should be applied to Mr. Porath’s case. 
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period of probation.  Taylor, 160 Idaho at 387; State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 128 
(Ct. App. 1996).  Since there was no condition of probation in the Judgment of 
Conviction authorizing incarcerating Mr. Porath for ninety days during his period of 
probation, Mr. Porath’s motion for credit for ninety days that he was in custody during 
his period of probation has colorable merit under Buys.  Because Mr. Porath’s motion 
has colorable merit under the credit statutes, the district court’s error in not addressing 
Mr. Porath’s motion for appointment of counsel was not harmless.   
Finally, the district court’s reliance on the purported stipulation to a particular 
credit award as a basis for denying Mr. Porath’s motion for credit was improper because 
the determination that the parties “stipulated” to a particular credit award vis-à-vis the 
time Mr. Porath served during the period of probation is clearly erroneous.  See, e.g., 
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007) (holding that a court will set aside factual 
findings by the district court as clearly erroneous when they are “unsupported by 
substantial and competent evidence”).  The only stipulation in the record dealt with the 
time Mr. Porath served pre-sentence, not the time he served during his ensuing period 
of probation. Specifically, there was a stipulation for credit for time served in the initial 
plea agreement in the 2013 case.  (R., p.81.)  That stipulation was reflected in the initial 
Judgment of Conviction.  (R., p.87.)  Since that stipulation was entered prior to the 
period of incarceration for which Mr. Porath is now claiming credit, that stipulation has 
no effect on Mr. Porath’s claim for credit. 
Furthermore, the transcript of the most recent sentencing and disposition hearing 
reveals there was no subsequent stipulation to credit in regard to the period of 
probation.  In fact, the parties never discussed the topic of credit for time served at all.  
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(See generally Tr.; see also R., pp.124, 272 (the global plea agreement which, unlike 
the initial plea agreement in the 2013 case, did not include any discussion of, much less 
a stipulation as to, credit for time served).)  Rather, as the transcript reveals, the district 
court made a judgment call as to credit for time served based on the information of 
which it was aware:   
THE COURT:  In the 2013 case, you do have 57 days for credit for time 
served.   And that’s the Court’s judgment.   
 
[THE PROSECUTOR]:  What was the credit again in ’13? 
 
THE COURT:  He had 57 days on the 2013 case and I don’t believe he 
served anymore time since then.   
 
(Tr., p.14, Ls.18-24.)  Therefore, there is no evidence, much less substantial and 
competent evidence, in the record to justify the district court’s conclusion that there was 
a stipulation to an award of credit vis-à-vis any time served during the period of 
probation.  As such, this Court should reject that factual finding as clearly erroneous.   
Even if there were such a stipulation, the district court still erred by relying on it 
without first ruling on Mr. Porath’s motion for appointment of counsel.  “The language of 
I.C. §18-309 is mandatory,” which means “a district court may only give credit for the 
correct amount of time served by the defendant prior to imposition of judgment in the 
case; the district court does not have discretion to award credit for time served that is 
either more or less than that.”  State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 20-21 (Ct. App. 2014).  
That means the district court cannot, under the statute, rely on a stipulation to a credit 
award for less than the time Mr. Porath actually served:  “The district court is not bound 
to accept either party’s calculations of the appropriate credit for time served in a Rule 
35(c) motion.  Instead, it is the district court’s duty to determine the accurate credit for 
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time served as reflected by the record and award that time accordingly.”  Id. at 21.  
Thus, Mr. Porath’s claim – that he actually served ninety days in custody during his 
period of probation – has colorable merit regardless of whether there was a prior 
stipulation to fifty-seven days of credit.   
 At any rate, for the same reasons discussed in depth in Section II, infra, these 
are precisely the sort of issues appointed counsel can help a pro se defendant 
investigate and address.  Thus, any remaining question about the validity of the credit 
award and potential stipulation by the parties only further reveals why the district court’s 
error in not appointing counsel upon Mr. Porath’s motion was not harmless.  As such, 
the district court committed reversible error by denying that motion on its merits without 
first ruling on his motion for appointment of counsel.   
 
II. 
 
The District Court Erred In The 2014 Case By Not Ruling On Mr. Porath’s Motion For 
Appointment Of Counsel Before Denying His Motion For Credit For Time Served 
 
 As in the 2013 case, the district court erred by denying Mr. Porath’s motion for 
credit for time served in the 2014 case without first ruling on his motion for appointment 
of counsel.  Wade, 125 Idaho at 523.  Thus, mindful that the claims for credit in his 
motion focus only on the time served during his period of probation in the 2013 case, 
Mr. Porath maintains this Court should reverse the order denying his motion in the 2014 
case.   
The Idaho Supreme Court has examined reason for appointing counsel under 
I.C. § 19-852 explaining:  “[T]he trial court should keep in mind that petitions and 
affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete.  Although 
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facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, they also 
may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the 
essential elements of a claim.”2  Brown v. State 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001), superseded 
by statute, (emphasis added); cf. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654 (2007).  As such, 
the deprivation of assistance of counsel in investigating and presenting claims such as 
Mr. Porath’s claim for credit for time served is improper.  Wade, 125 Idaho at 523 (citing 
inter alia, I.C. §§ 19-851 and 19-852). 
That deprivation also raises concerns under the Sixth Amendment, since the 
constitutional right to counsel exists at all critical stages, such as those where the 
assistance of counsel can help avoid prejudice to the defendant’s rights.  
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 562 (2006); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 
1385-86 (2012).  The Idaho Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated:  “A criminal 
defendant has a right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process, including 
pursuit of a Rule 35 motion.”  Wade, 125 Idaho at 523 (emphasis added); cf. State v. 
Ramsey, 159 Idaho 635, 637 (Ct. App. 2015); Carter, 157 Idaho at 902.  That 
conclusion is particularly appropriate as it relates to motions for credit for time served 
under I.R.E. 35(c), since such motions have a direct impact on the defendant’s liberty 
interests.  Proper resolution of motions for credit for time served affects when the 
defendant is ultimately deemed to have served out his sentence.  Thus, if a defendant 
                                            
2 While the Brown Court was dealing with a petition for post-conviction relief, it was 
specifically examining the appointment of counsel under I.C. § 19-852.  Brown, 135 
Idaho at 679.  Thus, while that statute no longer applies in the post-conviction context, 
see Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 n.1 (2004), the Brown Court’s analysis 
remains particularly relevant to the application of I.C. § 19-852 to Mr. Porath’s request 
for counsel. 
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remained incarcerated until he served the full term of sentence, improper resolution of a 
claim for credit for time served would prejudice his rights by subjecting him to an 
unauthorized period of incarceration.  See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386 (2012) (“any 
amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth Amendment significance”) (internal quotation 
omitted).  The need to prevent such prejudice is reflected in the district court’s duty to 
award credit for the time the defendant was actually incarcerated.  See Moore, 156 
Idaho at 20-21.  As such, a motion for credit for time served under I.R.E. 35(c) 
constitutes a critical stage of the criminal proceedings.   
 Accordingly, whether because of Idaho’s statutory right to counsel or the 
constitutional right to counsel, this Court should vacate the order denying Mr. Porath’s 
motion for credit for time served in the 2014 case and remand that case so that counsel 
can be appointed to assist Mr. Porath in investigating and, as appropriate, presenting, a 
claim for credit in that case. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Porath respectfully requests this Court vacate the orders denying his motions 
for credit for time served and remand these cases for further proceedings upon 
appointment of counsel to represent him. 
 DATED this 26th day of October, 2016. 
      ____/S/_____________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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